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1. SUMMARY: Petr seeks review of his conviction under 18 U .S.C. 
§ 1623 of making false statements before a grand juryo The government's 
case was based on§ 1623(c), which allows the government to make its 
case if it proves that two sworn statements are so inconsistent that one 
~ of them must be false. Petr contends (1) that declarations made before 
a federal grand jury under a grant of immunity cannot be used to establi~ 
I wovkl d.Riil~ ) a,.s rf YlM ~W\rtt~ ~ ~~ h \ ~ ~~~v~,~~ ~ +e.~h~~ 
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the corpus delect i of an inconsistent declarations prosecution under 
§ 1623{c) without it first being established that the immunized decla-
rations were false and (2) that petr's admission before a federal district 
judge that 9~/o of his grand jury testimony was false cannot be relied 
upon in sustaining a § 1623 conviction when th~ only theory presented to 
the trial court was one of inconsistent declarations. 
2. STATUTE INVOLVED: 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a} makes it a crime to 
knowingly make a false material declaration under oath "in any proceeding 
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States • 
§ 1623(c) provides for situations in which a single witness makes two or 
more inconsistent sworn statements: 
"(c) An indictment or information for violation 
of this section alleging that in any proceeding 
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury 
of the United States, the defendant under oath 
has knowingly made two or more declarations, which 
are inconsistent to the degree that one of them 
is necessarily false need not specify which decla-
ration is false • • " 
"In any prosecution under this section, the falsity 
of a declaration set forth in the indictment or 
information shall be established sufficient for 
conviction by proof that the defendant under oath 
made irreconcilably contradictory declarations 
material to the point in question in any proceeding 
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury." 
Thus, the government need not prove which of the inconsistent declaration 
was false through extrinsic evidence/but rather, the falsity of one of 
the two declarations is inferred from its inconsistency with the other. 
3. FACTS: In June 1976, under a grant of immunity pursuant to 
- 3 -
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18 u.s.c. § 6002, petr presented grand jury testimony implicating one 
Musgrave in illegal drug activity and leading ultimately to Musgrave's 
indictment. In September 1976 petr appeared in the office of Musgrave's 
attorney and in the presence of the attorney and a notary public gave 
an oral statement unde~ oath which was recorded and transcribed in which 
he recanted his grand jury testimony implicating Musgrave. Petr stated 
that much of what he had previously told the grand jury was not true. 
Armed with these admissions, Musgrave's attorney challenged the indict-
ments charging Musgrave with illegal drug activity. In an evidentiary 
hearing on Musgrave's challenge to the indictments, petr reaffirmed under 
oath that he had lied to the grand jury. In particular, petr stated 
I, that "possibly 100/o" of his grand jury testimony had been true. 
Shortly thereafter, petr was charged with five counts of making fals . 
statements to a grand jury in violation of § 1623. Evidence introduced 
against petr included excerpts from his testimony before the grand jury, 
his testimony in the attorney's office, and his testimony at the Musgrave 
found 
evidentiary hearing. The jury/petr guilty on three of the five counts. 
The CA 10 affirmed. The court first agreed with petr that the pro-
ceeding in the attorney's office was not a proceeding "ancillary to a 
court or a grand jury of the United States," but held that the evidentiar 
hearing conducted in the district court on Musgrave's challenge to his 
indictment did constitute a proceeding ancillary to the grand jury pro-
V Section 6002 provides: 
"No testimony or other information compelled under 
the order may be used against the witness in any 
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, 
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to 
comply with the order." 
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ceeding. In this regard, the court also held that admission into evi-
dence of petr's testimony at the Musgrave hearing did not create a fatal 
variance between proof at trial and the indictment. (The indictment con-
tained excerpts from petr's initial grand jury testimony and from his 
testimony in the attorney's office. It did not contain excerpts from 
his testimony at the Musgrave hearing.) The variance was not fatal 
because petr could have anticipated from the indictment what evidence 
would be presented at trial. 
TheCA 10 next turned to petr's contention that grand jury testimony 
~unized under 18 u.s.c. § 6002 may not be used to establish the corpus 
delecti of a prosecution for inconsistent declarations without a prior 
showing of its falsityo The court distinguished cases cited by petr for 
this proposition on the ground that in this case petr's testimony in 
the attorney's office and in the Musgrave hearing was not only inconsiste ~ 
with his immunized grand jury testimony but also contained an admission 
that he had in fact testified falsely before that grand jury. Petr's 
unequivocal admission that his immunized testimony before the grand jury 
had been false justified the use of the immunized testimony to establish 
the corpus delecti of his § 1623 prosecution. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that theCA lO's decision conflicts 
with circuit court decisions holding that immunized testimony may not be 
used to establish the corpus delecti of an inconsistent declarations 
~ prosecution without a prior showing that the immunized testimony was 
false. He argues that "to compel the defendant on the one hand to testif 
~ ·-
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truthfully under an order of immunity thereby setting aside his Fifth 
Amendment claim, but on the other hand, prosecuting him for inconsistent 
declarations without proving a violation of the immunity order is a 
~· violation of due process and [the defendant•s] Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Petn. at 10-llo 
5. DISCUSSION: The cases holding that immunized testimony cannot 
be used as the basis of an inconsistent declarations prosecution under 
§ l623(c) are the product of§ 1623(c) •s provision allowing the govern-
ment to make its case without proving which inconsistent statement was 
false. As the CA 7 stated in United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381 
(7th Cir. 1976), certo denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977), 11 Perjury by incon-
sistent statements must necessarily be shown through the use of the 
immunized testimony. 11 Because the government need not show which in-
consistent statement is false, the government may well be violating the 
terms of the grant of immunity by using truthful immunized testimony to 
prove the falsity of subsequent sworn testimony. When the subsequent 
inconsistent statements contain an admission that the earlier, immunized 
testimony was false, however, this reasoning seems to evaporate. Indeed, 
it appears that the government did not need to prosecute this case under 
an 11 inconsistent statements .. theory. It could simply have used petr•s 
sworn admission to prove the falsity of the earlier immunized grand jury 
testimonyo 
There is no response. 
I would denyo 
10/5/78 
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Supplemental Memorandum 
December 1, 1978 Conference 
No. 77-6949 Cert to CA10 
DUNN 
v. 
UNITED STATES Federal/Criminal Timely 
A response from the SG and petr's reply to that 
response have been received, and the case is set for discussion 
at the Conference this Friday. 
Section 1623(a) makes it a crime to give a material, 
false declaration in any proceeding ancillary to a grand jury 
proceeding. §1623(c) eliminates the need for the government to 
prove which of two inconsistent statements is false, thereby 
allowing a witness to be convicted under §1623(a) if he has made 
two contradictory declarations in proceedings anciallary to a 
grand jury proceeding. The SG recognizes that in the instant 
case it probably was unnecessary to proceed under the 
"inconsistent statements" rubric of §1623(c), as petr had 
admitted in sworn testimony that his grand jury testimony had 
been false. Thus, the immunity granted for that testimony was 
ineffectual, and the testimony was properly admissible to show 
that petr had lied before the grand jury. 
The SG maintains, however, that because the government 
proceeded against petr under §1623(c), this Court cannot assume 
that petr's grand jury testimony was false. Thus, the SG 
co~cludes tha~~c~a::s~e_;p~r~e~s~e~n~t~s~a~n~~i~m~p~o-r_.t~a-n.t._s.u._e.s.b~ion 
deserving the Court's plenary review: whether truthful, 
immunized testimony may be used as the partial basis for an 
inconsistent statements prosecution under §1623(c). The 
government argues that immunized testimony can be so used 
because the immunity extends only to use against the witness 
concerning crimes that occurred prior to the giving of the 
testimony. Because the crime involved here was petr's 
subsequent perjury, the SG insists that there is nothing wrong 
with using immunized testimony (even if truthful) as the partial 
basis for the prosecution. The government contends that, 




is strong dictum in some decisions indicating that some courts 
do not agree with the government's position. 
Nonetheless, the SG does not ask the Court to grant 
certiorari at this time. Rather, the government asks the Court 
to hold this case for the decision in New Jersey v. Portash, No. 
77-1489 (to be argued next week). The issue in Portash, as you 
will recall, is whether immunized testimony constitutionally may 
be used to impeach a defendant's testimony at his trial for the 
crime with respect to which he testified. Dunn of course 
differs importantly from Portash, as in the former the immunized 
testimony was used as the basis for a separate perjury 
prosecution, whereas in the latter the testimony was used to 
help convict the witness of the very crime with respect to which 
he testified under the grant of immunit. The SG contends, 
however, that the difference in Dunn means only that, if the 
Court affirms the New Jersey decision, the question here will 
remain open: Even if immunized testimony cannot be used with 
respect to crimes occurring prior to the giving of the 
testimony, it may be useable with respect in prosecuting the 
witness for his later perjury. If the Court were to reverse in 
Portash, however, the SG contends that affirmance in the instant 
case would follow a fortiori. 
In his reply, pe·tr reasserts that the proof at his 
trial varied substantially from the charges contained in the 
indictment, and that this in itself is enough to warrant the 
granting of certiorari. In addition, petr contends that the use 
3. 
of his grand jury testimony here is prohibited by the terms of 
the federal use immunity statute, 18 u.s.c. §6002. Under that 
statute, immunized testimony can be used only in a "prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to 
comply with the order." Petr claims that the structure of the 
provision indicates that witnesses' testimony may be used 
against them only if they ~ are prosecuted for giving a false 
statement and violated the order to give the immunized 
testimony. In the instant case there is no indication that petr 
violated the order to testify before the grand jury, and so he 
does not fall within the exception. 
I suppose that it does no harm to hold this ca~e for 
Portash, as the two cases involve related issues. Nonetheless, 
I question whether the Court should do anything ultimately but 
deny certiorari. Thus, if Portash were reversed (the Court 
ruling that immunized testimony could be used to impeach), there 
would be no reason to GV&R, as the decision below would follow a 
fortiori from the decision in Portash; similarly, there would be 
little point in granting plenary review in order merely to say 
that this is an easier case than Portash. If, on the other 
hand, Portash were affirmed, the Court would have to decide 
whether this is the appropriate case to address the question 
raised by the SG. It seems to me that it is not for three 
reasons. First, the SG himself admits that there is no square 
conflict. Second, it seems to me that the SG is correct in his 
analysis--that is, that the court below reached the correct 
4. 
result, albeit by somewhat muddied analysis. Third, I continue 
to be troubled by the fact that proceeding under the 
inconsistent statements provision of §1623(c) seems to have been 
entirely unnecessary in this case: Petr has twice admitted 
under oath that his grand jury testimony was false, and 
therefore the immunity qranted should not apply. 
11/30 David 
5. 
December 1, 1978 
Court ........... :'":"": ..... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No77-6949 
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Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel 
Petr asks that Daniel J. Sears, Esq., be appointed . to 
represent him. Mr. Sears represented petr from arraignment 
through the cert petn, and was last appointed by CA 10. He was 
admitted to the Colo. bar in 1968, the N. Mex. bar in 1969, and 
this Court in 1975. He was appointed Federal Public Defender 
in 1975. 




r VliV\AI' Vlt., , , o o o , o o o o o o o o o o o J .l t7 o o o 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . N<77-6949 








Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
Brennan, J ........................... . 
Stewart, J ........................... . 
White, J ............................ . 
Marshall, J .......................... . 
Blackmun, J ........... . 
Powell, J .............. . 
Rehnquist, J ........... . 




ABSENT NOT VOTING 
N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D 
• · .••••••• ) • · ... ·. · .• ·. · .•. ·. · .•• ·. · .•• 
• ·. . • . • . ·. ( ·. ·. ·. ·.• . • ·. ·. ·. ·. ·.. . • . . 
. . . . . . . . . ·I'-"· . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . 
.. ...... '1 
·········/ ·· 
May 2, 1979 
77-6949 Dunn v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that 
I took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~tqtrtntt <!fottrt ttf tltt 'Jtlttitttt ~flrlts 
1Ulasfringron, gl. <!f. 211pJt;t 
May 3, 1979 
Re: No. 77-6949 - Dunn v. United States 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Please substitute the attached page 2 for 






2 DUNN v. Ul"\ITED STATES 
of the term ancillary procreding in ~ H323. a phrase not de-
fined in that pro\'ision or elsewhere in the criminal code. 
More sprcifically. we must determine whether an interview. 
- ·in a private attorney's office at which a sworn statement is 
given constitutes a proceeding ancillary to a court or grand 
jury within the meaning of the statute. 
I 
On June 16. 1076. petitioner Robert Dunn testified before 
a federal grand jury under a grant of immunity pursuant to 
18 U. S. C. ~ 6002. 2 The grand jury was investigating illicit 
drug activity at the Colorado State Penitentiary where peti-
tioner had been incarcrratccl. Dunn's testimony implicated 
a fellow inmate. Phillip :\IusgraYc. in various drug-related 
offenses. FollO\Ying petitioner's appearance~ . the grand jury 
indicted l\'1 usgra vc for conspiracy to n{';ntifacture and dis-
tribute methamphetamine. 
ably rontrndirtory drrbration;: matrrial to the point in f]Urstion in any 
prorceding beforr or anrilbry to any rourt or grand jnry. Jt, :-:hall Jx. a 
de£ense to an indirtmrnt or information madr pursuant to tlw first srn-
tence of thi;; ~ub:;:rrtion that thr defendant at the time he made each 
declaration brlien•d thr dPrl.1ration was true." 
2 Undrr IS U.S. C.§ 6002: 
"Whrnevcr a witne~,; rrfu~r;;, on the basb of hi~ prh-ilrgr against self-
incrimination, to t<.':'tify or provide other information m a proceeding 
before or ancillary to-
"(1) a court. or g:rnnd jury of the United States, 
"(2) an agrnry of the Unitl'rl Statrs, or 
11 (3) either Hou"r of Congrrs;;, a joint committee of the two Housrs, or a 
commit.tre or a suhcommittrc of rith<'r Hou;;c, 
and the prrson prr~iding ovrr tltr procerding communirntes to the witnrs5 
an order i;;surcl unc!rr thi:< 11:1rt, the witnrso< ma~· not. rcfu~c to campi~· ''ith 
the ordrr on the ba:<i:; of his privilrgr again:<t ~ elf- incrimination; but no 
testimony or ot hrr information compl•lll'<l under t.ht· order (or any in-
formation din•ctly or indirC'etl~- drrivrd from such tr:<timony or othrr 
information) ma~- bn u"Pd again~! the witnr~s in any criminal ra~e. <·xrept 
a prosecution for perjury, giving :.1. fal:<e ~tatrmrnt, or othrrwi~e failing 
1o comply with the order," 
.ilt1lT tlttt <!Jcnrlttf tlft 'Jllttittb j;.taft ,ll' 
~M frittgLnt. ~. <!J. 2ll~Jl. ~ , 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART May 3, 1979 
Re: 77-6949 - Dunn v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although I tentatively expressed a different 
view during our Conference discussion, I am glad 
to join your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
•' 
~u:prmtt <!Jaurlaf tfrt ~b ~hrltg 
~rur!pngttm:, !l. OJ. 20.;t'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... . J , BRENNAN, JR. 
May 3, 1979 





Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
j 
.§npt"tlltt Qflturlltf tlrt ~lt ;§hUtS' 
~as'lfin:ghm. ~. (!}. 2llc?JJ.~ 
C~AM BERS O F" 
JUSTICE J OH N PA UL S T EVEN S 
May 4, 1979 
Re: 77-6949 - Dunn v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
C H AMBER S O F 
JU S TICE HARRY A. BLAC KMUN 
;%;uprtutt ~onrt ltf lilt ~nittb .§hmg 
~IUlJrittgtlltt, ~. ~· 2llc?)!..;l, 
( 
May 7, 1979 
Re: No. 77-6949 - Dunn v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
~u:punu {!fcurlltf f1rt 'J!fuit.t~ ,jtatts 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
'Jil' as fringttttt. 
May 17, 1979 
Re: No. 77-6949 -- Robert Dunn v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
My dissent here will be a silent one --
strictly graveyard. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~uttrtmt {!fottft cf tlrt ~ttittb ,.§ttdtil 
· ._uftingtcn. ~. <!J. 2llgtJ.1~ 
May 24, 1979 
V' 
Re: No. 77-6949 - Dunn v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
I 
My dissent, as Byron's, will be of the graveyard variety. 
Please join me. 
Sincerely,~-
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
..§u.p-r.cm.t <qltltrl ttf tltt> ~nittlt ;iftm<~ 
~~Ulyittgtcn. tB. <!} . .. 2!lgi.l!..;l 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N May 24, 1979 
/ 
Re: No. 78-5072 Davis v. Passman 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your recirculation of May 21. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMeERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~ttpt"ttttt <lJottrl of t!tt ~a- ~t~ 
. :.ufringhtn, ~. QJ. 2ll~'!~ 
May 26, 1979 
Dear Thurgood: 
Re: 77-6949 Dunn v. U.S. 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 










~ "' '"""' ~ ~ 
~1 --~ " 
~-1 
'f) 
I il' ~tt to ~- ::::; ~~ ::::1 
""'~ 
-......! er, ~ ~t -......! 
?~> 












s >) < ~ . 
c::: ~~ :... . t:d 
(/) 
"--.J\--:t 
I . I 
~~~ t"""' 'Tj --~ ·'"' i 
I 
>'1 _. ~ 




~J I '-< I 
1 z· '"": 
~~ 
"f. 
\.......:. 
I 
